Cassation Court
Civil and Commercial Circuit - No. 139/2009
Session Date: 17 November 2009
Appeal by Cassation No. 139 of 2009 - civil appeal by cassation.

 
(1,2) Cassation “litigants in an appeal by cassation” – judgment “appealing by cassation against a judgment: litigants in an appeal by cassation” - “correcting material errors in a judgment”- claim “litigants in a claim”.
 
(1) Appeal by cassation – allowed in the case of a person who was party to the litigation until the issuance of the judgment against him, whether such person be a principal litigant, a guarantor of a principal litigant, introduced or self-introduced to such claim – S. 1 of Law No. 12 of 2005 on Appeal by Cassation in Non-Criminal Matters.
 
(2) A material error that does not affect the validity of the judgment and may be corrected – its requirement – that it shall have a basis in the judgment that indicates the correct fact relating to its jurisprudence, in such a way that such error becomes clear when compared with the valid matter which is established in such jurisprudence.
 
(3,4) Rent “renting of places: the general rules of rent: termination of the rent contract: notice to evict” – contract – rescission of contract” “the rent contract”.
 
(3) Rent contract – the rule is that it terminates upon the expiry of the period specified in it – the desire by one of the two parties to evict the rented chattel – should serve notice on the other party, two months before such eviction if the contract period exceeds six months, by a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt – Sections 24 and 25 of the law No 2 of 1975 on the Renting of Places and Buildings which applies to the disputed fact.
 
(4) In the case of mutually binding contracts, rescission of the contract may only be done by mutual agreement of the parties, or by virtue of a judgment.
 
(5) Contract “its interpretation” – the first instance court “its power to comprehend the facts and assess the evidence and circumstances in the claim” “its power to interpret agreements and documents”.

The court of the first instance has full power to understand the facts and assess the evidence and circumstances in the claim and interpret agreements and documents in such a manner as it deems most expressive of the will and intention of the parties thereto, while seeking guidance in the facts and circumstances of the case, with no scrutiny thereon by the Cassation Court – its condition – that the court establishes its jurisdiction on the basis of reasonable grounds, sufficient to support such jurisdiction, without departing in such interpretation from the literal meaning of the of such documents – (an example of a reasonable deduction concerning agreement by a rent contract to rescind and terminate such contract before the application of the Law No 4 of 2006.
 
1- Section 1 of the Law No 12 of 2005 on the cases and procedures relating to Appeal by Cassation in non-Criminal Matters provides that “Litigants may appeal before the Cassation Court against judgments issued by the Court of Appeal ...” This means that appeals by cassation may be lodged by any person who was party to the litigation until the issuance of the judgment against him, whether such person is an appellant or respondent, a principal litigant, a guarantor of a principal litigant, introduced or self-introduced to such claim for litigation or being joined to one of the two litigation parties.
 
2- Section 138 of the Law of Procedures provides that “The validity of a judgment shall not be affected by pure material scriptural or arithmetical errors occurring therein. The court shall correct any such error in its judgment by virtue of a decision of its own, or based on an application by one of the litigants, with no litigation thereon. The clerk of the court shall record such correction on the original version of the judgment which shall be signed by him and the chairperson of the session ...” This means that such error should have a basis in the judgment that indicates the correct fact relating to its jurisprudence, in such a way that such error becomes clear when compared with the valid matter which is established in such jurisprudence. It is evident from the judgment appealed against by cassation that it based its reasons on the conviction that the Appellant has no capacity in the claim, and that it corrected the formality of appeal by rendering the litigation against the Minister of Economy and Finance, to whom it addressed the application and he accordingly submitted a statement of defence. The statement on the preamble to the judgment that the Appellant was the second respondent therefore becomes a mere material error, which the court issuing the judgment may correct.
 
3- Sections 24 and 25 of the Law No 2 of 1975 on the Renting of Places and Buildings, which apply to the disputed facts, provide that the rule is that the rent contract terminates upon the expiry of the period specified in such contract. If either party desires to evict the rented chattel he shall serve notice to the other party two months before the eviction, by a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt.
 
4- It is established that in mutually binding contracts, the rescission of such contract may only be the result of mutual agreement by the contracting parties, or by virtue of a judgment.
 
5- It is established jurisprudence of this Court that the court of first instance has full power to understand the facts and assess the evidence and circumstances in the claim and interpret agreements and documents in such a manner as it deems most expressive of the will and intention of the parties thereto, while seeking guidance in the facts and circumstances of the case, with no scrutiny thereon by the Cassation Court, so long as such court has established its jurisdiction on the basis of reasonable grounds, sufficient to support such jurisdiction, without departing in such interpretation from the literal meaning of the of such documents. The judgment appealed against by cassation has concluded that the First Respondent served notice to evict the rented chattel on the Appellant and the Second Respondent, and that the latter agreed by virtue of its letter dated 25.7.2005.This means that the parties to the rent contract had agreed on its rescission and termination, before the application date of the Law No 4 of 2006 on Real Estate Renting. The deduction in the judgment in this connection was reasonable and acceptable, without departure from the literal meaning of the aforesaid letter by the Second Respondent. It was built on a basis that was established by the documents and arriving at the conclusion of such judgment. It furthermore includes a response that refutes the pleading of the Appellant to the contrary.

The Court

Having reviewed the documents and listened to the report reiterated by the judge-rapporteur, and after the litigations and deliberations; and as this appeal by cassation has satisfied its formalities.

The facts, as revealed by the judgment appealed against by cassation and other documents, are as follows. The First Respondent brought a claim No 1038/2006 – civil – general – applying for a judgment evicting the Appellants from the rented chattel, detailed in the rent contract dated 1.8.2004, committing the Second Appellant to the amount of 44,000 Riyals and both Appellants to the consideration for any future use of such chattel. It stated that by virtue of the rent contract dated 1.6.2004 the two Appellants took on rent the said property for use as government housing, for a monthly rent of 106,000 Riyal to pay paid according to the system of payment applied by the government. The contract was automatically renewable unless one of the parties notifies the other of his desire to evict at least two months before the eviction. On 10.7.2005 the landlord notified the Government Housing of its intention to terminate the contract. The latter responded with agreement but without evicting the property, prompting the First Respondent to bring the claim. The court issued a judgment ordering the two Appellants to pay the amount of 318,000 Riyals and rejecting the other applications. The Respondent lodged an appeal No 651/2007 and the court issued a judgment on 27.2.2008 quashing the judgment appealed against, ordering the eviction of the rented chattel and its delivery to the landlord. Against such judgment, each f the two Appellants lodged an appeal by way of cassation, No 60/2008 and 69/2008. The Cassation Court decided to combine the two appeals, applied cassation on the judgment and referred the case to the Court of Appeal. The Respondent prompted the correction of the appeal in form by litigation against the Minister of Economy and Finance in his capacity as the highest chief of the Government Housing Directorate. On 21.6.2009 the court issued a judgment quashing the appealed judgment and ordering the eviction of the rented chattel. The material error in the name of the Second Respondent was corrected on 6.9.2009, to become the Minister of Economy and Finance in his official capacity. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs lodged against the said judgment, in his official capacity, an appeal by cassation No 128/2009. Likewise, the Qatari Institution for the Protection of Children and Women lodged an appeal by cassation No 139/2009. The First Respondent submitted a statement in each of the two appeals in which it pleaded against the admission of the appeal in connection to the First Appellant, in his official capacity, and for the dismissal of both appeals. The two appeals by cassation were presented before this Court, at the deliberations chamber and the Court fixed a session for their consideration and ordered the combination of the second appeal to the first.

First: Appeal by Cassation No 128/2009:
As regards the pleasing pleading by the First Respondent for the dismissal of this appeal in connection to the Appellant in his official capacity, such pleading is appropriate. Section 1 of the Law No 12 of 2005 on the cases and procedures relating to Appeal by Cassation in non-Criminal Matters provides that “Litigants may appeal before the Cassation Court against judgments issued by the Court of Appeal ...” This means that appeals by cassation may be lodged by any person who was party to the litigation until the issuance of the judgment against him, whether such person is an appellant or respondent, a principal litigant, a guarantor of a principal litigant, introduced or self-introduced to such claim for litigation or being joined to one of the two litigation parties. It is established by the documents that the two Appellants lodged, against the judgment of the Court of Appeal which was issued on 27.2.2008, two appeals by cassation No 60/2998 and 69/2008. After combining the said two appeals the Cassation Court issued a judgment by cassation and referred the case to the Court of Appeal for a fresh judgment. Upon considering the appeal, as revealed by the reasons of the judgment appealed against by cassation, the First Respondent prompted the correction of the form of appeal by directing litigation against the Minister of Economy and Finance in his capacity as the highest chief of the Government Housing Directorate, which was represented in the claim through a deputy. The judgment mentioned in its reasons the person having capacity in the claim, stating that such is the Minister of Economy and Finance. However, the preamble to the judgment stated that the Appellant was the Second Respondent. The material error in the name of the Second Respondent was corrected on 6.9.2009, to become the Minister of Economy and Finance in his official capacity. Section 138 of the Law of Procedures provides that “The validity of a judgment shall not be affected by pure material scriptural or arithmetical errors occurring therein. The court shall correct any such error in its judgment by virtue of a decision of its own, or based on an application by one of the litigants, with no litigation thereon. The clerk of the court shall record such correction on the original version of the judgment which shall be signed by him and the chairperson of the session ...” This means that such error should have a basis in the judgment that indicates the correct fact relating to its jurisprudence, in such a way that such error becomes clear when compared with the valid matter which is established in such jurisprudence. It is evident from the judgment appealed against by cassation that it based its reasons on the conviction that the Appellant has no capacity in the claim, and that it corrected the formality of appeal by rendering the litigation against the Minister of Economy and Finance, to whom it addressed the application and he accordingly submitted a statement of defence. The statement on the preamble to the judgment that the Appellant was the second respondent therefore becomes a mere material error, which the court issuing the judgment may correct. The current appeal by cassation is thereby lodged by a person other than the one against whom the judgment was issued. It is therefore inadmissible. Since the first reason in the appeal by cassation No 139/2009 is identical to the aforesaid, it becomes as aforesaid baseless.

Secondly: Appeal b Cassation No 139/2009:
In the second reason the Appellant contends against the judgment appealed against by cassation that it involved an error in the application of the law and deficiency in reasoning, because such judgment considered the rent contract as rescinded from the date notice of eviction served on it and on the Second Respondent on 10.7.2005 despite that rescission can only be implemented by virtue of a judgment. The aforesaid prevented the consideration of the application or otherwise of Law No 4 of 2006, which was subsequent to the relationship between the parties. The provisions of such law should therefore apply to such relationship and the rent period should be extended. The judgment appealed against by cassation is therefore defective and worthy of cassation.

This contention is inappropriate. Sections 24 and 25 of the Law No 2 of 1975 on the Renting of Places and Buildings, which apply to the disputed facts, provide that the rule is that the rent contract terminates upon the expiry of the period specified in such contract. If either party desires to evict the rented chattel he shall serve notice to the other party two months before the eviction, by a registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt.  It is established that in mutually binding contracts, the rescission of such contract may only be the result of mutual agreement by the contracting parties, or by virtue of a judgment. It is evident from the documents, with no contention by parties, that the First Respondent has notified the Appellant and the Second Respondent of eviction on 10.7.2005, and that the latter responded in agreement to the eviction request. It is further established that the first instance court has full power to understand the facts and assess the evidence and circumstances in the claim and interpret agreements and documents in such a manner as it deems most expressive of the will and intention of the parties thereto, while seeking guidance in the facts and circumstances of the case, with no scrutiny thereon by the Cassation Court, so long as such court has established its jurisdiction on the basis of reasonable grounds, sufficient to support such jurisdiction, without departing in such interpretation from the literal meaning of the of such documents. The judgment appealed against by cassation has concluded that the First Respondent served notice to evict the rented chattel on the Appellant and the Second Respondent, and that the latter agreed by virtue of its letter dated 25.7.2005.This means that the parties to the rent contract had agreed on its rescission and termination, before the application date of the Law No 4 of 2006 on Real Estate Renting. The deduction in the judgment in this connection was reasonable and acceptable, without departure from the literal meaning of the aforesaid letter by the Second Respondent. It was built on a basis that was established by the documents, and it arrived at the conclusion reached by such judgment. Therefore, contention against the judgment regarding the aforesaid reason amounts to no more than substantial argumentation on a matter which s exclusively for the first instance court to determine, and should not be raised before the Cassation Court. The entire appeal by cassation is therefore baseless.
For the aforesaid, this appeal is hereby dismissed.